



Director of
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The Overnight Reports, printed on yellow paper as the final section, will often contain materials that update other articles in the *Daily*.

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SITUATION REPORTS

AFGHANISTAN-USSR

Press reports over the past few days have indicated that the Soviets are deeply involved in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan.

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Before the Soviets undertake any major military operations, we would expect them to complete their control over the major cities, establish greater protection over major lines of communication, and introduce additional combat troops into Afghanistan.

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Press reports of major Soviet counterinsurgency operations launched against remote rebel strongholds, however, appear to be exaggerated. According to these reports, for example, a Soviet brigade was wiped out in Takhar Province around 30 December. [REDACTED]

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Many of these press reports originate from the Afghan exile community in Pakistan, long a source of overblown accounts of rebel successes. Others are picked up on the rumor mill in Kabul. [REDACTED]

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We believe that at this point the Soviets are still consolidating control over major cities and airfields. [REDACTED]

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Soviet contact with the insurgents, however, is likely to increase. The Soviets will have to continue to protect cities and roads while they recruit and train a new Afghan Army, a process that will take at least a year. In the meantime, the rebels can be expected to continue to harass military convoys and Afghan Army patrols, test Soviet defenses, and increase terrorist and propaganda activities inside the cities. Moreover, the rebels will try to expand their control over those areas where there are no concentrations of Soviet forces. [REDACTED]

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In response to these pressures, the Soviets may opt to conduct airstrikes against rebel concentrations or against villages suspected of assisting the insurgents or conduct occasional operations in especially troubled areas, such as Paktia Province. If the Soviets plan to conduct countrywide counterinsurgency operations in an

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attempt to eliminate the rebel movement, however, they would almost certainly commit a substantially larger number of troops. [REDACTED]

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Afghan Propaganda

In an approach almost certainly recommended by Moscow, the new Afghan leaders continue to portray themselves as moderates attempting to save Afghanistan from US interference. Former President Amin has been repeatedly described as a "US spy" who, at Washington's direction, committed excesses in an effort to discredit the revolution. On several occasions, government leaders have stated that the revolution is not socialist and that it represents all democratic classes, not just the workers. In an effort to contrast themselves with the hated Amin regime, they have announced the release of political prisoners, promised that no one will be imprisoned without a trial, and stated that there will soon be a constitutional and free election. Even the name of the ruling party has been changed slightly and the country's flag--now almost identical to the Soviet flag--may be replaced by one similar to the prerevolutionary banner. [REDACTED]

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IRAN

The militants occupying the US Embassy have been encouraged by UN Secretary General Waldheim's departure from Iran. [redacted]


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The captors clearly view Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal to meet with Waldheim as an indication that the more moderate members of the Revolutionary Council have failed in their efforts to induce Khomeini to accept a face-saving way out of the crisis. The militants' effort to exploit the situation by demanding that Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh hand over Charge Laingen indicates that they believe Ghotbzadeh in particular is vulnerable. [redacted]

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Yesterday the militants opened their conference of "national liberation movements" reportedly attended by representatives of 16 groups from various parts of the world. According to the captors, they will try one of the hostages, Lt. Col. David Roeder, as a war criminal for his actions during the Vietnam War and may bring him before this forum. [redacted]

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
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Demonstrations

Followers of Azarbayjani spiritual leader Ayatollah Shariat-Madari clashed in the streets of Qom yesterday with supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. Revolutionary Guards were forced to fire their weapons into the air and use tear gas to prevent the demonstrators from attacking Khomeini's residence. When news of the fighting reached supporters of Shariat-Madari in Tabriz, they marched on the radio and television station there and temporarily captured it. [redacted]

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The new unrest follows increasing efforts by Khomeini's supporters to intimidate Shariat-Madari. One leader of Shariat-Madari's political party was arrested earlier this week and there are widespread reports that Shariat-Madari's residence in Qom is being closely watched by Khomeini backers. Shariat-Madari may even be under virtual house arrest. [redacted]

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Media Campaign

Since the start of the hostage crisis Iranian broadcasts have consistently appealed to the Muslim world and especially Arab states to back Tehran against the US. Little distinction is made between Shia and Sunni Muslims except for broadcasts aimed at Iraq with its large Shia population. The Iranians have been harshly critical of some Arab governments for not giving Iran more support--Iraq and Saudi Arabia are the usual targets. Kuwait, in contrast, is usually treated favorably because of its opposition to UN economic sanctions. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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BRIEFS AND COMMENTS

IRAQ-SYRIA-USSR: Reaction to Afghanistan

Iraq's strong public condemnation yesterday of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan underscores Baghdad's deep apprehension over the USSR's intentions toward Iraq, and a further deterioration in relations between Baghdad and Moscow is likely. Syria, in contrast, has at least initially cast its lot with the USSR.

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Iraq broke its public silence on Afghanistan by denouncing the USSR for blatant interference. Baghdad attributed Moscow's move to geopolitics, describing Afghanistan as the "strategic key to the oil region." Iraq warned neighboring states against alliances with the US, however, and instead offered itself as a rallying point for area governments seeking protection from external interference.

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Iraqi suspicions of the USSR will be strengthened by a revival of antigovernment activity by the Iraqi Communist Party.

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Until quite recently, Iraq was almost completely reliant on the Soviets for large quantities of modern weaponry. Baghdad has already shifted some 50 percent of its purchases to Western suppliers in order to lessen dependence on the USSR. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan probably will accelerate this shift.

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The Syrian media have broken step with the Iranians and have supported the Soviet move in Afghanistan. Although most senior Syrian officials are preoccupied with the Baath Party congress now in session, the press treatment may reflect an initial decision by Damascus to side with Moscow, its principal military supplier.

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USSR: Tank Production

The Soviets apparently have ended production of the obsolete T-55 medium tank at the Omsk tank plant, probably to prepare to begin producing a more modern tank this year. This would substantially increase the Soviets' capability to supply their most modern tanks to their own forces and to foreign arms recipients.

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The T-72 tank or possibly the T-80--believed to be an improved T-72--is likely to be produced

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total annual production of tanks in the T-64, T-72, and T-80 series could increase by some 30 to 40 percent over the next few years. The Soviets thus far have produced about 13,000 to 15,000 T-64 and T-72 tanks.


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LEBANON-PALESTINIANS: Iranian Volunteers

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[redacted] Lebanese Christians allied with Israel stated in a radiobroadcast yesterday that Iranian volunteers had arrived in Tyre. The Christians said they will shell the town and warned its inhabitants to evacuate. Christian shelling could escalate fighting throughout southern Lebanon, especially if Palestinian camps near Tyre should be hit. [redacted]

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EL SALVADOR: Negotiations Continue

Continuing negotiations between military leaders and Christian Democrats to form a new coalition government focused yesterday on a Christian Democratic demand for the departure of junta member Andino, a representative of the business community. The Christian Democrats want a left-of-center majority on the new five-man junta which they believe would accelerate the pace of reform and draw popular support away from violence-prone organizations on the far left. Also to be negotiated is the continued tenure of Defense Minister Garcia, who is closely identified with the armed forces' recent crack-down on leftist extremists. [redacted]

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

RHODESIA: Political Prospects

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It will not be easy for the British to translate their success at the bargaining table in London into a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia. The assembling of the armed guerrilla forces at the designated points is far from complete although the disengagement deadline has passed. The British plan to keep some assembly points open for a few more days. Should the UK decide to use Rhodesian security forces to round up large numbers of guerrillas--which it would do only as a last resort--the cease-fire could break down. Even if the cease-fire holds, other problems in the election process or in the eventual transfer of power could upset the settlement.

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The guerrilla leaders want the cease-fire to succeed. They are concerned, however, that London's insistence on moving ahead quickly with the cease-fire and on calling elections as early as February are an attempt to shape events in Bishop Muzorewa's favor. Both guerrilla groups would prefer more time to prepare for the election because the ban on their activities inside Rhodesia has only recently been lifted.

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Jockeying for Power

Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union now seems set on contesting the election separately from Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union. Nkomo has consistently argued that the Front should contest the elections as a team, and the Front's foreign backers--among both the Frontline States and the Communist countries--generally support this position.

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ZANU is resisting an electoral alliance with ZAPU, fearing that association with Nkomo would hurt it in competition with Muzorewa for the vote of the Shona-speaking blacks, who comprise about 70 percent of the population. ZANU is also confident its support is more widespread than ZAPU's. ZANU's insistence on running

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separately may be designed to prevent Nkomo from claiming the prime ministership in a Patriotic Front coalition if ZANU should get more votes than ZAPU. []

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Although Muzorewa easily won the election last April, that victory cannot be regarded as an accurate indicator of his strength because ZANU and ZAPU did not participate. Moreover, Muzorewa will be judged now on the basis of his performance as Prime Minister and will be open to charges that he failed to end the war, that he has been overly solicitous of white morale, and that he failed to improve the living conditions of the vast majority of the country's blacks. []

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While the British have not taken away Muzorewa's title as "Prime Minister," he will be seen to have relinquished power to the British Governor. Still, he has the advantages of an experienced organization and a modern political campaign financed largely with South African money. []

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Nkomo will probably receive from 15 to 25 percent of the total black votes drawn mainly from the Ndebele-speaking people. Although Nkomo was once the "father figure" of Zimbabwean nationalism, having held a leading role in the movement since the mid-1950s, it is now questionable whether he can compete effectively with Muzorewa and Mugabe for the Shona vote. Nkomo himself is a member of a Shona subtribe called the Kalanga; this group, however, has longstanding ties with the Ndebele, and Nkomo will probably be regarded essentially as the Ndebele candidate. []

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Nkomo's and Muzorewa's personal popularity will largely determine the success of their parties at the polls, but the same cannot be said of Mugabe in relation to ZANU. Mugabe's position of leadership is less dependent on personal charisma; he is merely the first among equals in an organization that makes decisions by consensus in time-honored Shona style. ZANU is said to have considerable well-organized support at the local level throughout much of eastern Rhodesia, but its extent remains untested. []

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Election Outlook

It is unlikely that any party will win an absolute majority. We expect that Muzorewa and Mugabe will split the Shona vote; that Nkomo will win the Ndebele vote but little more; that none of the other black contestants will command many seats; and that Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front Party will win all 20 whites' seats. Such an outcome would make a coalition government inevitable. [redacted]

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In this situation, the 20 whites could play a key role. The constitution precludes the whites from playing the decisive role, however, because it forbids them from joining in a coalition government with any party other than the black party that has won the most seats. [redacted]

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Thus, if Muzorewa's UANC wins at least 31 seats--and no other black party wins more--Muzorewa could govern in coalition with Ian Smith and the new government would be little different from the old. On the other hand, if Mugabe and Nkomo together gain an absolute majority, they could form a coalition. There are several other possibilities, the most realistic being a Muzorewa-Nkomo coalition. [redacted]

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Contingencies

There is no guarantee that the losers in the election--or in the coalition-building process that is likely to follow--will accept the results. The opposing armies have not been disbanded or disarmed. Either side could try to overturn the election outcome--in effect resuming and probably widening the war. [redacted]

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The 1,200-man Commonwealth military force has responsibility only for monitoring the cease-fire; the Governor is counting on the commanders of the opposing armies to maintain it. If the election takes place as scheduled, the Commonwealth force probably will stay in Rhodesia long enough to oversee the transfer of power to a new government. It may also oversee plans for the post-election integration of the opposing armies into a single Zimbabwe national army, but it will not be obliged to ensure that such integration is carried out. [redacted]

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There is also the possibility that South Africa will intervene if the war should resume or there is extreme political instability. South African actions could range from logistic support for the security forces to open military intervention in defense of the whites. [redacted]

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OVERNIGHT REPORTS

(The items in the Overnight Reports section have not been coordinated within the Intelligence Community. They are prepared overnight by the Office of Current Operations with analyst comment where possible from the production offices of NFAC.)

El Salvador

Mario Antonio Andino, the third civilian member of the Salvadoran Government junta, resigned last night to allow the armed forces to reorganize the cabinet. The other two civilians resigned Thursday night in opposition to what they consider is a turn to the right by the Army's commanders. [REDACTED]

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